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Abstract
This paper explores patterns of discrimination between residents and foreign creditors during 
recents sovereign debt restructurings. We analyze 10 recent episodes distinguishing between 
neutral cases in which the sovereign treated creditors equitably irrespective of their nationality 
and instances of discrimination against residents and non-residents. We then present evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that these patterns of discrimination can be explained by the 
origin of liquidity pressures, the ex ante soundness of the banking system and the extent of 
the domestic corporate sector’s reliance on international fi nancial markets. On the theoretical 
side, we present a simple model of a government’s strategic decision to diferentiate between 
the servicing of its domestic and its external debt. In our model, the basic trade-off facing 
the authorities is to default on external debt and in so doing restricting private access to 
international capital markets or to default on domestic debt, thereby curtailing the banking 
sector’s capacity to lend to domestic fi rms.
Keywords: Sovereign default, discrimination, bank credit, foreign capital.
JEL classifi cation: F34, E65.
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Introduction
In the spirit of Bulow and Roggof (1989), early models on sovereign risk and
default overlooked the role played by domestic creditors during debt crises.1
Much of that literature tried to explain a well known paradox in international
economics: in the absence of effective contract enforcement mechanisms in the
sovereign context and given that governments care only about their residents’
welfare, why do sovereigns honour their external debt at all, and why do foreign
creditors lend them in the first place? Domestic debt was seldom contemplated
in these models either because the literature focused on developing countries
assumed to rely mostly on external sources of finance or because the lack of
a commitment technology was assumed to affect primarily cross-border loans.
However, more recent papers have begun to pay attention to the importance
of domestic creditors as potentially significant sources of funding also for devel-
oping and emerging economies. A case in point is Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
whose historical database challenges some existing pre-conceptions about the
importance of domestic debt. Indeed, they show that, on average, residents
held almost two thirds of total public debt for the 64 countries that they cover
during the period 1914 to 2007. They also call for a better understanding of the
way in which the relative seniority of domestic vs. foreign debt contributes to
explain how crises unfold. This paper does precisely pull in that direction, an-
alyzing patterns of discrimination between resident and non-resident creditors
during sovereign debt restructurings both from an empirical and a theoretical
perspective.
On the empirical side, we conduct a case study analysis on ten recent sov-
ereign debt restructurings.2 Three different scenarios are identified in these case
studies: instances of discrimination against non-resident creditors; neutral cases
in which similar losses were undergone by residents and non-residents; situa-
tions in which the sovereign discriminated against resident financiers. This last
scenario provides some evidence against an assumption commonly held in the re-
cent theoretical literature on sovereign debt restructurings: that in the presence
of foreign and domestic debt obligations the sovereign will either give preferen-
tial treatment to residents or will not discriminate.3 We are certainly not the
first ones to note that residents and non-residents have been treated differently
in past debt restructurings. Zettelmeyer and Sturzenegger (2007) analyze six
sovereign debt restructurings calculating haircuts instrument by instrument and
showing wide variations in the losses undergone by different creditors. Enderlein
et al. (2007), in turn, construct a coerciveness index showing that in a num-
ber of episodes, domestic creditors were given a harsher treatment than foreign
ones. Neither of these contributions, however, tries to provide an explanation
for these differential treatments. In this paper we go beyond this descriptive
approach, exploring a number of hypotheses about the reasons that may push
1For a comprehensive review of the early literature on sovereign debt see Eaton and Fer-
nández (1995).
2We add three recent episodes to the cases covered in Díaz-Cassou et al. (2008).
3 See Broner et al (2009), Gennaioli et al. (2009) or Brutti (2008).
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sovereigns to discriminate in one or the other direction.
More specifically, we identify three key mechanisms contributing to shape
governments’ strategy vis-à-vis resident and non-resident creditors in our case
studies. First of all, the origin of liquidity pressures mattered: it tended to
be the case that instances of discrimination against foreign creditors coincided
with situations in which the sovereign was struggling primarily to roll-over ex-
ternal debt, and vice versa. However, we find significant exceptions to that
pattern which we attribute to specific idiosyncratic factors related with the cur-
rency denomination of domestic debt, the degree of central bank independence
or the extent of financial dollarization in the countries of our sample. Second,
because financial institutions tend to be the main holders of domestic debt in
developing economies, the ex ante soundness of the banking system constitutes
an important determinant of governments’ decision to discriminate. When the
debt crisis was preceded by a banking crisis, we find that governments were
more reluctant to involve residents in the restructuring. Instead, discrimination
against residents was more common where the banking system was perceived to
be sound ex ante and when financial intermediation was relatively unimportant
for the real economy. Third, the private sectors’ reliance on international finan-
cial markets did also shape the government’s discriminatory stance. Indeed, we
find evidence supporting the argument that under tight domestic financial con-
straints or when foreign financing was of prime importance for resident firms,
governments were more reluctant to discriminate against non-residents in order
to preserve their corporate sector’s access to external sources of finance. This
explanation for the existence of discrimination among creditors contrasts with
that presented in Kohlscheen (2009) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004),
who argue that the difference in treatment is related to the political situation
of the country.
On the theoretical side, we construct a stylized model which shows the mech-
anisms a play. Our model is a variation of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001),
who considered an economy facing two types of collateral constraints limiting
its borrowing capacity from both foreign and domestic creditors.4 Their focus,
however, was on how the two constraints interact to affect both prices and assets
sales. Instead, we modify the model as in Sandleris (2008) and introduce public
borrowing. We depart from his work by allowing the government to endoge-
nously differentiate repayments to foreign and domestic creditors. For a given
debt structure, the key decision faced by the government is whether to honour
payments due to domestic banks and to foreign creditors. When it defaults
on its domestic obligations the government is affecting banks’ balance sheets,
reducing their ability to lend further to the private sector. On the other hand,
when it defaults on external creditors, the government is negatively affecting the
value of domestic collateral, which reduces the availability of foreign financing
for resident firms.5 In this setup, the government has incentives to discriminate
in one or the other direction depending on factors such as the substitutability
4Holmstrom and Tirole (2002) present a similar framework.
5 See Sandeleris (2008) for a similar argument and Trebesch (2009) for empirical evidence
on the impact of defaults on private external financing.
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of domestic and foreign capital, the impact of the sovereign default on private
external borrowing and the health of the banking sector.
This paper relates to Sandleris (2008), who argues that Governments have
incentives to avoid external defaults given that these send the wrong signal to
capital markets, reducing the private sector’s access to foreign capital. It also
relates to Broner et al (2009), Gennaioli et al. (2009) and Brutti (2008). In
Broner et al. (2009) debt is private and the government’s role is to enforce con-
tracts. They show that, given that a government has incentives to enforce debt
contracts between residents, the existence of secondary markets in which debt
instruments can be traded explains foreigners’ willingness to lend to residents.
Gennaioli et al. (2009) and Brutti (2008) study frameworks in which the sov-
ereign owes money both to residents and to foreigners. However, these models
take the absence of discrimination as given, and focus on the implications of
sovereign defaults on private borrowing. The main take away of these papers is
that the existence of complementarities between private and public borrowing
has the potential to limit the risk of sovereign defaults. Our paper also relates to
recent contributions on implicit seniority. In Jeanne and Bolton (2008) seniority
among creditors is taken as given. Contrary to this view, we present evidence
that implicit seniority is state dependent, and arises as the result of balancing
the costs and benefits of defaulting on different types of investors.
Next section summarizes the evidence on selectiveness and discrimination
collected from the 10 episodes of sovereign debt restructurings that we cover.
Section 3 introduces a number of hypotheses to explain these patterns of dis-
crimination and tests the relevance of these mechanisms for the countries of
our sample. Section 4 introduces a model that endogenizes default selectiveness
and shows how the default choice relates to underlying fundamentals. Finally,
Section 5 concludes and presents directions for future research. Tables, figures
and the more involved proofs are included in the Appendix.
Evidence on selectiveness: a case-study approach
This section identifies instances of discrimination between domestic and external
creditors in 10 recent episodes of sovereign debt restructuring: Argentina, Be-
lize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Pakistan, Russia,
Ukraine and Uruguay. Some of the key features of these debt restructurings are
summarized in Table 1, that can be found in the appendix. The cases covered
in this section can be broadly grouped in three categories: countries in which
the sovereign discriminated against external creditors; countries in which the
sovereign adopted a ‘neutral’ approach; countries in which the sovereign dis-
criminated against domestic creditors. We focus primarily on the early stages
of the debt crises during which the sovereign still retained some room for ma-
noeuvre to adopt the type of strategic behavior studied in this paper.
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Discrimination against external creditors
The cases in which the sovereign did more clearly try to spare resident cred-
itors from the direct impact of the debt workout were Belize, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador and Pakistan. On February 2007, the government of Belize
completed the preemptive restructuring of 6 international bonds with maturi-
ties ranging from 2008 to 2015 and a combined face value of US$571 million
(about 44% of total debt). The vast majority of holders of these instruments
were non-residents, and the government did not try to restructure other domes-
tic instruments, which represented about 13% of total sovereign debt. In turn,
the Dominican preemptive debt restructuring carried out in between April 2004
and October 2005 focused on bilateral official debt (Paris Club), two series of
international bonds with a total face value of US$1.100 million, and commercial
debt (London Club). Overall, this represented about 18% of total sovereign
debt. Again, in this case no purely domestic debt instruments were restruc-
tured, although some residents may have held part of the international bonds
that were exchanged.
The case of Ecuador is more complex. Initially, the authorities tried to ring-
fence the 1999 default to very specific instruments: Past-Due Interest and Dis-
count Brady bonds. Eventually, however, the authorities were forced to launch
a comprehensive debt restructuring which included bilateral official debt, the
entire stock of Brady bonds, Eurobonds, and commercial debt. Overall, and
excluding official debt, total private claims in default surpassed US$7 billion
(about 45% of total debt). Although domestic debt was included in the restruc-
turing, residents were granted a preferential treatment. Indeed, the unilateral
rescheduling of domestic bonds maturing between September 1999 and end-2000
was carried out at a 9% cost in NPV terms, which contrasts with the 19 to 47%
haircut undergone by the holders of Eurobonds and Brady bonds (Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer, 2007).
Finally, Pakistan’s main concern was to restructure bilateral official debt
and address a severe balance of payments crisis: three Paris Club treatments
were signed in January 1999, January 2001 and December of that same year for
a total amount of close to US$17.5 billion. As a result of the ‘Comparability
of Treatment Clause’ imposed by the Paris Club, private obligations were also
rescheduled by the government of Pakistan: Eurobonds for an amount of US$610
million were restructured by the end of 1999, and an agreement was reached with
the London Club in July 1999 involving commercial loans with a face value
of US$929 million. Eventually, the overall amount of restructured obligations
constituted about 37% of total debt. Although domestic debt amounted to
almost 50% of total debt in the case of Pakistan, resident creditors were entirely
spared from the restructuring. As explained below in more detail, this was
facilitated by the fact that the government could rely on the monetization of
fiscal deficits in order to remain current on domestic debt denominated in local
currency.
Table 1 suggests that discriminating against external creditors had little in-
fluence on outcomes such as the duration of the debt restructurings, the losses
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ultimately borne by investors or the degree of coerciveness with which creditors
were involved in the debt workout. This is largely due to the substantial varia-
tion observed in each of these dimensions among the four countries that form this
sub-sample. On the one hand, both the Belizean and the Dominican restructur-
ings were completed in only 6 months, carrying a mild haircut and, according
to the index developed by Enderlein et al. (2007), in a relatively non-coercive
manner. On the other hand, the Ecuadorian and Pakistani restructurings took
much longer to be completed (14 and 11 months respectively), carried a sub-
stantial haircut and were more coercive in nature. It would seem that rather
than the direction of discrimination between resident and non-resident creditors,
what mattered to explain these outcomes was whether the restructurings were
preemptive or not. Indeed, while the Dominican and Belizean restructurings
were entirely preemptive and entailed only minor and punctual arrears on sov-
ereign obligations, Ecuador defaulted rather comprehensively on both external
and domestic debt and Pakistan accumulated substantial arrears with bilateral
official creditors. There is some ground to argue, therefore, that the smoothest
restructurings in terms of duration, haircut and coerciveness tend to coincide
with the preemptive cases.
Neutral cases
Within our sample of countries, Uruguay, Grenada and Dominica come close to
having adopted a ‘neutral’ restructuring approach. The preemptive restructur-
ing announced by the Uruguayan government in March 2003 involved its entire
stock of tradable government securities: debt worth US$5.3 billion (equiva-
lent to 42% of total debt), 44% of which was held by residents. Although the
government tried to accommodate investors’ specific demands, the same ex-
act conditions (a ‘maturity extension’ option and a ‘benchmark bond’ option)
were offered to all the holders of these securities irrespective of their nation-
ality. However, participation in the exchange was significantly higher among
residents: 99% against a participation of 89% among non-residents. This could
be partly attributed to moral suasion on the part of the government or to reg-
ulatory incentives. Nevertheless, the Uruguayan debt restructuring is broadly
viewed as being of a non-discriminatory nature, reflecting the market-friendly
and cooperative strategy adopted by the authorities.
In the case of Grenada, a total debt amounting to approximately US$ 237
million in principal (40% of total public debt) was exchanged for new US$
and Eastern Caribbean dollar-denominated bonds after the devastating effect
of Hurricane Ivan forced the government to suspend payments on most classes
of its outstanding obligations. Given concerns over the restructuring’s impact
on the financial system, the positions of domestic banks were taken on board to
design the debt restructuring strategy launched in October 2004. In addition,
the authorities committed to continue servicing the obligations traded in the
Regional Government Securities Market (RGSM), which was partly aimed at
maintaining access to a source of short-term financing and liquidity manage-
ment. Overall, however, the burden absorbed by residents and non-residents
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was of a comparable magnitude: about 40-45% in NPV terms. The Grenadian
debt restructuring, therefore, can be considered neutral.
Due to scarce information the case of Dominica is more difficult to assess.
There is some ground to argue that the authorities did consider the idea of
ring-fencing domestic financial institutions from the effects of the restructuring
given that the government did initially express its intention to exclude domestic
creditors from the restructuring announced in December 2003. However, the
authorities were eventually forced to include residents in the debt workout. Al-
though the government tried to reach a separate agreement with each of the
main domestic banks depending on their specific exposure and vulnerabilities,
this debt exchange was eventually conducted on the principle that a certain
level of inter-creditor equity should be maintained. Nevertheless, the most siz-
able domestic restructuring operation was carried out with a public entity: the
Dominica Social Security Agency. This implies that a substantial portion of Do-
minica’s domestic restructuring simply equated to an intra-public sector transfer
of resources not really affecting obligations held by the private sector.
Table 1 shows that, if compared with the other sub-samples corresponding
to the countries that discriminated in favour of specific categories of creditors,
the neutral cases tend to be associated with a lower coerciveness index. In fact,
a possibility which is explored later in more detail is that one of the factors
shaping countries’ decision to be neutral is a willingness to signal their goodwill
vis-à-vis their creditors. This seems to be particularly clear for the case of
Uruguay, which was characterized by the collaborative approach adopted by the
authorities, evidence of which was the mild haircut attached to the government’s
offer (on the range of 5-20% in NPV terms). In Grenada and Dominica the
government did also adopt a market-friendly debt restructuring approach, which
is consistent with the hypothesis that being neutral does partially constitute a
signalling device. However, and maybe due to the extent of the fiscal problems
undergone by these two countries (debt to GDP ratios of 130%), the haircut
associated with these debt restructurings were much higher. If the duration of
debt restructurings is understood as an indication of their smoothness, it would
seem that the strategy of being neutral, collaborative and market friendly paid
off for the countries of this sub-sample. Indeed, Uruguay’s was the shortest
debt restructuring among the countries of our sample (only two months), and
Dominica’s and Grenada’s debt restructurings were also relatively short (about
half a year).
Discrimination against residents
Three cases fall in this scenario: Argentina, Russia, and to a lesser extent
Ukraine. The Argentine debt restructuring was the most contentious case among
the countries of our sample, reflecting the complexity of the restructured debt
and the non-collaborative stance adopted by the authorities after the December
2001 default. However, what is more relevant to our analysis is that prior to
defaulting in December 2001, the Argentine government went at great length to
mobilize domestic sources of finance in order to substitute for a loss of access
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to international financial markets. This was done through the exertion of moral
suasion on firms to absorb ‘patriotic’ bonds, through financial engineering oper-
ations like the June 2001 ‘mega-swap’, and through the semi-coerced exchange
of bonds for ‘guaranteed loans’. All these pre-default measures constituted an
incremental and increasingly desperate attempt to avoid an international de-
fault and to save the convertibility regime. Ultimately, it is well known that
this strategy failed, substantially increasing the exposure of the domestic fi-
nancial sector to public debt and thereby exacerbating the long-term economic
dislocation caused by the crisis.
The bulk of the liquidity pressures undergone by the Russian government in
1998 were originated in the domestic government securities market.6 Because in-
vestors thought a devaluation of the ruble more likely than a sovereign default, a
widening of the yield-differential between ruble denominated securities and Eu-
robonds made it increasingly difficult to roll-over domestic instruments. In this
context, when the Duma failed to ratify an IMF-endorsed package of stabiliza-
tion measures, the government defaulted on GKOs and OFZs while committing
to remain current on post-soviet external debt obligations. This amounted to
a default on a debt worth approximately US$30 billion at pre-default exchange
rates. It is unclear which proportion of that debt was in the hands of residents,
and estimates range between 35% and 80% (Owen and Robinson, 2003). The
Russian debt restructuring, therefore had a domestic bias both in terms of the
jurisdiction in which the restructured instruments were issued and in terms of
the nationality of the holders of these instruments. However, it is worth noting
that on top of the haircut associated with the ‘Novation’ scheme, foreign hold-
ers of ruble-denominated instruments faced capital controls, as a result of which
they underwent larger losses than resident bondholders.7
Ukraine’s debt restructuring was carried out in two distinct stages. In years
1998 and 1999, a succession of selective restructurings with specific creditors was
completed in order to bridge mounting liquidity needs. These selective restruc-
turings did simply postpone the resolution of the underlying debt problem, and
by year 2000 the government was forced to carry out a comprehensive restruc-
turing of its entire stock of international bonds. We consider this a case of early
discrimination against residents because the first deal closed by the Ukrainian
authorities during the wave of selective restructurings was reached precisely with
domestic banks. This was completed in September 1998, affecting a variety of
treasury bills with a total face value of HrV800 million, equivalent to close to
US$130 million or one third of domestic banks’ total holdings of T-bills. This
debt exchange carried a relatively mild haircut ranging in between 5% and 9%
in NPV terms. The following debt restructuring actions, instead, tended to
affect primarily international creditors. Overall, therefore, the Ukrainian debt
6The main types of bonds traded in the Russian market for government securities were
the so-called GKOs and OFZs. This market was opened to non-resident investors in 1996.
Interest payment on these securities absorbed over 70% of total interest payments in the
months leading to the default.
7Foreign creditors were forced to place all cash proceeds in a non-interest bearing ‘transit
account’ for one year.
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restructuring was not one in which residents suffered larger losses than non res-
idents. However, what matters for our analysis is that residents were the first
category of creditors to be involved in the Ukrainian debt restructuring.
An examination of the indicators provided in Table 1 suggests that, among
the countries of our sample, debt restructurings tended to be more complex
for the countries that discriminated against residents. This is illustrated in
the much longer duration of these restructurings: 46 months in Argentina, 35
months in Ukraine and 24 months in Russia. In addition, the Argentine and
Russian debt restructurings were the most coercive among the countries of our
sample, reflecting the non-collaborative approach adopted by the authorities in
these two episodes. The Ukrainian debt restructuring, in turn, was compara-
tively less coercive. Again, this suggests that the degree of coerciveness tended
to be associated with whether a restructuring was preemptive or not.
Explaining the patterns of discrimination
In this section we identify a number of factors that may have contributed to
explain the patterns of discrimination between residents and non residents ob-
served in our case studies. More specifically, we explore whether the origin of liq-
uidity pressures, specific features of domestic financial systems and the reliance
of the domestic private sector on international capital markets contributed to
create incentives for the sovereign to discriminate in one or the other direction.
The origin of liquidity pressures
A first hypothesis is that the decision to discriminate depends on the origins of
the liquidity pressures undergone by the authorities. If a government is primar-
ily struggling to meet external obligations it may opt to spare resident creditors
from a restructuring, or to offer them more lenient terms. Indeed, under such
circumstances the liquidity relief potentially extracted from resident creditors
may be considered insufficient for the government to assume the political lia-
bility of failing to honour its domestic contractual obligations or of putting the
stability of the financial system at risk (see below). Conversely, if struggling
primarily to roll-over domestic debt, the government may opt to discriminate
against residents. In this scenario, the potential liquidity relief to be extracted
from non-residents may be deemed insufficient to compensate for the effects of
the loss of access to international financial markets that is likely to be associated
with the restructuring of external debt both for the government itself and for
the domestic corporate sector (see below). Summing up this first hypothesis, if
the sovereign is struggling to roll-over external (domestic) obligations we would
expect to observe discrimination against non-residents (residents).
This hypothesis needs to be qualified for at least two reasons. First of
all, the currency denomination of domestic debt obligations is likely to play a
relevant role in the decision to discriminate in one or the other direction. If a
substantial part of that debt is denominated in local currency and the central
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bank lacks independence, the government may resort to seigniorage and inflation
in order to reduce the burden of domestic debt servicing without explicitly
restructuring its contractual obligations. This link between domestic debt and
government’s incentives to inflate has been recently emphasized by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2008). The bottom line for this paper is that we would expect
discrimination against resident creditors to be less likely under scenarios of
fiscal dominance and in countries with a large stock of domestic currency debt.
This does not mean that residents will not bear the burden of the crisis in such
setups. Far from it, inflation may wipe out the real value of the debt instruments
they hold. However, this type of losses falls outside of the scope of this paper,
which sticks to a “narrow” definition of discrimination centred on the direct
participation of residents and non residents in the restructuring.
Second, there may be situations in which the government tries to squeeze
residents in order to remain current on external obligations. This could be done
in various ways. For instance, a domestic restructuring of dollar-denominated
debt could be instrumental to free up resources later used to honour obligations
owed to non-residents. Alternatively, the government could coerce residents into
absorbing further volumes of foreign currency debt. We would expect this form
of discrimination against resident creditors to be more likely if the domestic
financial system is highly dollarized, giving room for the government to extract
domestically the currency that is needed to honour external obligations. In-
stead, if there are few dollars in circulation domestically, soaking liquidity from
residents in order to remain current externally would not avoid the depletion
of the central bank’s stock of foreign exchange reserves. This may turn out to
be counterproductive if the debt crisis is compounded by a currency crisis, as is
often the case in emerging markets.
Do our case studies provide some evidence in support of the liquidity pres-
sures hypothesis? Our preferred indicators to track the origin of liquidity pres-
sures would be the ratio of domestic short-term debt to total short-term debt
or the ratio of domestic debt service to total debt service. Unfortunately, infor-
mation on the maturity profile of domestic debt or the decomposition of debt
servicing is scant for the countries of our sample. We are therefore constrained
to use two alternative indicators: the ratio of domestic to total debt (see Figure
1) and the proportion of domestic debt to total restructured debt (see Figure
2). With the caveat that it does not take the servicing profile of domestic vs.
external debt into account, higher values of the former indicator should be as-
sociated with more intense domestic liquidity pressures. In turn, the second
indicator gives us an idea of the extent to which it would have been possible
for governments to restructure the total amount of debt that was ultimately
restructured involving only domestic creditors. Therefore, the higher that ra-
tio, the more likely the government discriminated against residents. In order to
find out whether the two special scenarios mentioned above applied to any of
our case studies, we also compare the ratio of financial dollarization (reported
in Figure 1 as the percentage of deposits denominated in foreign currency) and
the degree of fiscal dominance at the time of their respective debt restructurings
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(reported in Figure 2 as the Cukierman index of central bank independence).8 ,9
Note: DR's debt composition of year (t+2)
Sources: CLYPS, Articles IV, IMF Country Reports, Reviews under the Stand-By-Arrangements, Owen and Robinson (2003),
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% Total debt, (t-1)
Total domestic debt (currency comp. n.a.) Domestic debt in foreign currency
Domestic debt in national currency External debt
Dollarization (t-1)
Figure1: Public debt composition and financial dollarization
Consistent with our hypothesis on the role of liquidity pressures, Figure 1
shows that the countries of our sample with a lower proportion of domestic to
total debt are Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Belize, the three of which
discriminated against non-residents in their respective debt restructurings. In
addition, and as we would expect, Figure 2 shows that these countries did also
display low ratios of domestic debt to restructured debt. Surprisingly, however,
the proportion of domestic to total debt and the ratio of domestic to restructured
debt were the highest in Pakistan, which is the fourth case in which residents
were either spared or treated preferentially in the debt workout. The currency
denomination of its domestic debt together with the lack of independence of its
central bank may provide an explanation for the Pakistani exception. Indeed,
Figure 2 shows that Pakistan had the least independent central bank among
the countries of our sample. It may well be, therefore, that the government
monetized a substantial part of its deficit, diluting the burden of domestic debt
8Sources for Figures 1 and 2: CLYPS databse; Art. IV reports; Owen & Robinson (2003);
Polillo and Guillen (2005), Carstens and Jácome (2005), Jácome and Vázquez (2005), Díaz-
Cassou, Erce-Domínguez and Vázquez-Zamora (2008), Moody’s (2007) national sources (Sec-
retaria de Estado de Hacienda, Republica Doninicana); authors’ calculations.
9The ratios reported in Figure 2 correspond to period t, with the exception of Russia, where
we report data for t-1. This is justified by the fact that after the August 1998 Russian default,
this ratio becomes distorted due to the strong fluctuations of the rouble. Such an exchange
rate effect is not so acute in the other cases either because the debt restructuring was launched
closer to the end of the corresponding year, because domestic debt was not denominated in
domestic currency or because the exchange rate was more stable. No CBI available for Belize.
The CBI reported for Uruguay corresponds to year t-3. Because Dominica and Grenada are
members of the ECCU, we assume their CBI to be one (maximum degree of central bank
independence)
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and partly overcoming the liquidity pressures stemming from local currency
claims in the hands of residents. Agha and Khan (2006) provide an empirical
account on the significance of fiscal dominance in Pakistan which supports this
hypothesis. Although this practice has become less common in recent years,
they argue that a substantial portion of fiscal deficits was still financed through
the State Bank of Pakistan in the late 90s. This could only have eased domestic
liquidity pressures, thereby shaping the outcome of this debt restructuring.
* Russia: (t-1)
Notes: No Central Bank Independence Index (CBI) data for Belize. Uruguay: (t-3)
For Dominica and Grenada we assume CB is independent since they are members of ECCU.
Sources: CLYPS, Articles IV, Owen and Robinson (2003), Polillo and Guillen (2005), Carstens and Jácome (2005), Jácome and Vázquez
















Domestic debt (% restructured debt, t)* CBI (t-1)
Figure 2: Domestic debt to restructured debt and Central Bank
independence
In line with our hypothesis, Russia, the only country of our sample that
managed to stick to a discriminatory approach against residents all through its
debt restructuring, had a relatively high proportion of domestic to total debt.
In fact, as mentioned above, it is well known that in this case liquidity pressures
were mostly generated by rouble denominated treasury bills issued domestically
(Owen and Robinson, 2003). Especially in light of the aforementioned Pakistani
experience and given the relative lack of independence of its central bank (see
Figure 2), an interesting question is why the Russian authorities did seemingly
restrain from resorting to inflation to honour and dilute such domestic debt
instruments. A possible explanation for these divergent experiences is that by
the late 90s Russia had recently completed a painful process of monetary sta-
bilization, overcoming years of hyperinflation and fast economic decline. Under
such circumstances, the Russian government is likely to have been more cau-
tious when deciding on whether to involve the central bank in the resolution
of its debt crisis. A similar explanation may apply to the case of Ukraine,
where a comparable stabilization process was undergone prior to the first wave
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of selective restructurings of domestic debt obligations in 1998.
The Argentine experience of early discrimination against resident creditors
differs from Russia’s in that the pressure to alleviate domestic liquidity pressures
was less intense. In fact, Figure 1 shows that, among the countries of our sam-
ple, Argentina did not have a particularly high proportion of domestic to total
debt. Rather, there is ground to argue that in this case the observed pattern of
early discrimination against residents was mostly aimed at substituting external
sources of finance, from which the Argentine government had been effectively
cut out in the months leading to the default, for domestic sources of finance. As
mentioned above, this was done initially by exerting moral suasion on residents
(firms, banks and pension funds) to increase their exposure to the sovereign,
and later by coercing them into restructuring specific instruments. Given that
the domestic financial system was highly dollarized, there was a relatively large
pool of privately held foreign currency in the hands of residents which the gov-
ernment tried to soak in order to remain current externally. After the sovereign
default was consummated in December 2001, this motivation disappeared and
the discriminatory measures adopted by the authorities were mostly aimed at
softening the impact of the crisis on resident creditors.
According to the liquidity pressures hypothesis, the countries that adopted
a neutral approach should be expected to have obtained a non-negligible liq-
uidity relief from the inclusion of resident creditors in the restructuring. In
fact, in Dominica, Grenada and Uruguay domestic obligations amounted to
about 30% of total obligations. However, other motivations may also explain
these countries’ restructuring approach. Most notably, some governments may
avoid discrimination in order to signal their goodwill and cooperative disposi-
tion towards their external creditors. This motivation is likely to have been
particularly relevant in the case of Uruguay. Indeed, Uruguay’s emphasis on
inter-creditor equity (as well as the low haircut that was eventually attached to
this restructuring) is best explained by the government’s intention to differen-
tiate this crisis resolution package from the contentious Argentine experience.
Probably, the adoption of such a market-friendly stance was also encouraged by
the IMF, whose leverage on the authorities was particularly strong given that its
Uruguayan financial program was the largest in history if measured against the
size of the recipient economy (Díaz-Cassou et al, 2008). Uruguay’s struggle to
present its restructuring as the antithesis of Argentina’s uncooperative stance
towards bondholders may therefore explain why, in spite of having a similar
debt structure and comparable levels of financial dollarization, both countries
adopted such different strategies vis-à-vis their domestic and external creditors.
In fact, this same line of reasoning may explain why the mechanisms that are
explored below as determinants of the patterns of discrimination observed in
our case studies appear to have played a somewhat weaker role in the case of
Uruguay.
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The domestic financial system
The most important domestic holders of sovereign debt in emerging and devel-
oping countries are usually resident financial institutions. As a result, it is often
the case that domestic banks are highly exposed to government paper in such
economies. The countries of our sample were no exception in that respect: as
shown in Figure 3, in period t-1, public debt constituted about 30% of total
banks’ assets in Pakistan and Russia, 17% in Argentina and close to 10% in
Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ukraine and Uruguay. Given
such levels of exposure to the public sector, a risk associated with the restruc-
turing of domestic debt in emerging economies is its potential impact on the
stability of the banking system. On the asset side, the ‘haircut’ associated with
the restructuring constitutes a direct loss for financial institutions to the extent
that they hold restructured debt instruments. Perhaps even more importantly,
on the liability side the restructuring can feed a loss of confidence on domestic
banks, potentially large scale deposit withdrawals and an interruption of in-
terbank credit lines. In this context, restructuring sovereign debt in emerging
markets poses the risk of triggering or aggravating a banking crises and a credit
crunch.
One argument defended in this paper is that, as a result of certain features of
their banking systems, some governments tend to be more vigilant than others
over the risks induced by a debt restructuring on domestic financial stability,
which may contribute to explain certain patterns of discrimination between res-
idents and foreign creditors. Firstly, there is a wide variation in the importance
of financial intermediation in emerging markets. This is illustrated in the differ-
ences observed in the stock of credit to the private sector among the countries
of our sample which, at the outset of the crises, ranged from almost 80 per cent
of GDP in Grenada or Uruguay to less than 10 per cent of GDP in Ukraine
(see Figure 3). Interestingly, the countries in which we have observed instances
of early discrimination against resident creditors are precisely those with the
lowest ratios of credit to the private sector: Argentina, Russia and Ukraine.
This may reflect the fact that the authorities from countries with a low
level of financial intermediation can expect debt restructurings to have a more
limited impact on the overall performance of their non-financial private sec-
tors. Such sovereigns, therefore, may have less to fear about discriminating
against domestic creditors if so is needed to address a debt crisis. This seems
to apply especially to the cases of Russia and Ukraine, where the disconnection
between the banking system and the non-financial corporate sector was partic-
ularly acute prior to the 1998 crisis (Huang et al., 2004). Instead, in countries
with high levels of financial intermediation, the authorities may be more con-
cerned about potential spillovers from the financial sector to the real sector.
Indeed, where the savings investment process relies more strongly on financial
intermediation, weakening the banking system as a result of the debt restruc-
turing can be expected to be more costly in terms of foregone future economic
growth (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2005). As a result, such countries may be more
reluctant to involve residents in the debt workout.
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Source: WDI, IFS and authors' calculations.
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Figure 3: Domestic credit and public debt as a share of total bank assets
In addition to financial intermediation, we hypothesize that the ex ante ro-
bustness of the financial system was a factor contributing to shape the govern-
ment’s decision to discriminate. When the government perceives the financial
system to be sound ex ante, the risks associated with the restructuring for do-
mestic banks may be considered manageable. In such a context it may pay off
for the government to try to extract liquidity domestically (i.e. to discrimi-
nate against resident creditors) in order to avoid an external default and/or to
preserve some degree of access to international financial markets. Conversely,
when the debt crisis is compounded by severe banking vulnerabilities, involving
domestic creditors in a debt restructuring may seem counterproductive from
the outset. Indeed, governments engulfed in a banking crisis are probably fac-
ing the need to re-capitalize domestic banks, as a result of which they may be
more reluctant to imposing further losses onto financial institutions through a
debt restructuring (i.e. to discriminate against foreign creditors). Summing up,
we argue that the ex ante robustness of the banking system should be nega-
tively correlated with governments’ propensity to discriminate against external
creditors.
Do our case studies bring some support to this hypothesis? To proxy for
the ex ante soundness of the financial system we analyze the evolution of two
variables in the quarters surrounding the beginning of the debt restructuring
process. The first variable captures the evolution of total deposits in local cur-
rency and in US$ measured as an index. The second variable captures the
evolution of the liquidity support extended to the banking sector by the mon-
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etary authority. As in Laeven and Valencia (2008), we proxy this liquidity
support with claims of the monetary authority on the banking sector, expressed
as a percentage of total deposits and foreign liabilities in the banking system.
Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the evolution of these two variables for the ten
countries of our sample.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the three countries that discriminated against
residents appeared to have relatively sound banking systems prior to the debt re-
structuring. As shown in Figure 4, in Argentina the total deposit base remained
stable up until the quarter of the June 2001 mega-swap, which we identify as the
beginning of the debt restructuring. Another manifestation of the relative sta-
bility of the Argentine financial system was the low volume of liquidity injected
by the central bank, which remained well below 1 per cent of total deposits
and foreign liabilities until the mega-swap. In this context, the government
had some reason to be confident about the capacity of the banking sector to
absorb larger volumes of public debt, or even the losses imposed by a selective
restructuring. However, right after the mega-swap was completed, the banking
system began to experience severe problems. In fact, the run on deposits of
November-December 2001 was largely due to an increasing public concern over
the future solvency of Argentine banks given their high exposure to a sovereign
on the brink of default. This illustrates the fact that placing an excessive burden
on domestic banks at the early stages of a debt crisis poses substantial risks to
financial stability even when these institutions seem resilient ex ante.
As suggested by the growing deposit base exhibited in both countries, the
banking systems of Russia and Ukraine also appeared to be in a relatively sta-
ble situation in the quarters leading to the beginning of their respective debt
restructurings. Added to the aforementioned low level of financial intermedia-
tion both in Russia and Ukraine, this probably contributes to explain why the
government discriminated against residents at the early stages of these debt re-
structurings. As suggested by the observed surge in liquidity support extended
to domestic financial institutions by the monetary authority in Russia, severe
banking problems emerged following the August 1998 default. However, and fur-
ther illustrating the disconnection between the domestic financial system and
the real economy, this banking crisis did only constrain moderately the recov-
ery of Russia’s real output, which was quite pronounced in 1999 and thereafter
(Owen and Robinson, 2003). In the case of Ukraine, instead, we do not observe
any clear indication of the presence of post-restructuring banking problems. In
part, this may be due to the fact that during the later stages of this debt crisis,
the bulk of the restructuring’s burden was borne by external creditors and not
by resident institutions.
In contrast, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and, to a lesser extent, Pak-
istan, three of the countries that discriminated against non-resident creditors,
experienced substantial banking problems prior to the launching of their re-
spective debt restructurings. In the Dominican Republic, this materialized in
massive injections of liquidity: although in slight decline, the central bank’s
claims on the banking sector still constituted about 40 per cent of total deposits
and liabilities in the quarters leading to the launching of the debt restructuring.
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Indeed, to a large extent the Dominican debt restructuring was the result of the
mishandling of this banking crisis and the ensuing surge in public debt required
for recapitalization purposes. In Ecuador, both a collapse in deposits and a
surge in liquidity injections are apparent a few months before the 1999 default.
Although Pakistan was not going through a full-blown banking crisis, the large
and rising central bank’s claims on the banking sector suggests the existence
of significant fragilities in the financial system. In line with our hypothesis on
the role of the domestic banking system, it is highly likely that fears about
the impact of the restructuring on its already troubled financial institutions did
constrain the choices ultimately made by the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and
Pakistan as regards the treatment of its resident creditors.
Another country where the debt restructuring was preceded by a banking
crisis was Uruguay. In that case, a sustained fall in dollar-denominated deposits
can be observed in the quarters leading to the restructuring. This was largely
due to a contagion from the Argentine crisis which materialized in massive
deposit withdrawals on the part of cash-strapped Argentine nationals caught
in the Corralito. Given the extent of its banking problems, the fact that the
Uruguayan authorities opted to apply a neutral approach instead of granting
a preferential treatment to domestic financial institutions contrasts with the
experiences of the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Pakistan. To some extent,
this may be due to the fact that by the time of the launching of the debt
restructuring the worse of the banking crisis had already passed, as suggested
by the evolution of the central banks’ claims on the banking sector, which were
already close to zero in 2003. As mentioned above, another factor which we
consider important to explain this exception is Uruguay’s struggle to present its
restructuring as the antithesis of Argentina’s crisis resolution approach.
The domestic private sector’s reliance on international fi-
nancial markets
Our last hypothesis regarding governments’ strategic behavior vis-à-vis their
creditors relates to the importance of external funding for the private sector.
Various recent contributions such as Arteta and Hale (2008) have emphasized
that sovereign debt crises have a negative impact on the corporate sector’s access
to international financial markets in emerging economies. Similarly, Trebesch
(2009) finds that the extent of this loss of access is partly determined by the
coerciveness with which the government treats its external creditors during a
debt restructuring. Along these lines, we argue that country authorities are
likely to take their corporate sector’s reliance on international financial markets
into account when deciding whether to discriminate between resident and non
residents. If keeping access to external finance is deemed important for the
functioning of the corporate sector, the government may decide to act more
coercively on its domestic financiers while trying to fully or partially spare its
foreign creditors from the effects of the debt workout. Such a strategic stance
would be adopted in the hope of preserving some level of corporate sector’s
access to international financial markets and, in so doing, reduce the impact of
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the crisis on the real economy. Instead, according to this line of reasoning, a
small reliance on international financial markets on the part of the corporate
sector should tend to reinforce the sovereign’s incentives to discriminate against
non residents when conducting a debt restructuring.
This section proposes various indicators to compare the private sector’s re-
liance on international financial markets among our sample countries. Because
we argue that access to external sources of finance is all the more important
for the corporate sector when credit is constrained domestically, these indica-
tors are presented as ratios against the stock of domestic credit to the private
sector.10 In the first place, we compare the average weight of the various types
of capital inflows considered in the balance of payments statistics over the five
years that preceded the crises. As shown in Figure 5, according to this metric
the countries that discriminated against domestic creditors at an early stage
of their debt restructuring appear to be those that exhibited a greater depen-
dency on international sources of finance. This was particularly clear in Ukraine,
where foreign banks’ loans to the non-financial private sector averaged over 80%
of domestic credit prior to the crisis.11 This reflects the fact that in Ukraine
and to a lesser extent in Russia, the underdevelopment of the financial system
was such that recently privatized firms had a very limited access to domestic
credit during most of the 1990s. In such a scenario, retaining some degree of
access to international financial markets for the corporate sector may have been
prioritized over the objective of mitigating the impact of the restructuring of
domestic obligations on financial stability. In the case of Argentina, on top of
FDI, activity in international financial markets was dominated by debt portfo-
lio investment, which averaged 12% of domestic credit, second only to Ukraine
among the countries of our sample. However, IFS data does not allow us to dis-
aggregate between debt portfolio flows directed to the private or to the public
sector, as a result of which this can only be considered a partial indicator of
domestic firms’ reliance on international financial markets.
10The IMF’s 2009 Global Financial Stability Report uses this same approach to analyze
whether domestic credit could be used as a substitute for external financing in a number of
emerging economies (GFSR, 2009).
11For the cases of Dominica and Grenada IFS data does not allow to disentangle between
debt and equity portfolio investment and private financial, private non financial and public
other investment. That’s why Figure 5 does not provide the distinction.
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Sources: IFS, WDI and authors' calculations.
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Figure 5: Net capital inflows: balance of payment statistics
Apart from FDI, which tends to behave in its own idiosyncratic way dur-
ing emerging market crises (Gopinath and Aguiar, 2005), the only three cate-
gories of capital flows reported by IFS that are unambiguously directed to the
private sector are equity portfolio flows, other investment towards the private
non-financial sector (mostly foreign bank loans to domestic firms), and other
investment towards the private financial system (mostly interbank loans involv-
ing a foreign bank). Figure 6, that can be found in the Appendix, compares
the weight of these three flows for our sample countries during the years leading
to the crises. Consistent with our hypothesis, Figure 6 shows that the average
for each of these flows in the three countries that discriminated against resi-
dents (Argentina, Russia and Ukraine) was significantly higher than that for
the other countries of our sample. Again, the Russian and Ukrainian private
sectors’ reliance on international sources of finance was largely explained by
domestic credit constraints. Two years prior to the launching of the restruc-
turing, private equity flows amounted to 7% of domestic credit in Russia and
20% in Ukraine, while foreign bank loans to the private non financial sector
reached as much as 11% and 91% of domestic credit respectively. These figures
are much higher than those of any of the countries that did not discriminate
against resident creditors. In Argentina, instead, net outflows both of equity
and bank loans to the corporate sector were registered in the years that pre-
ceded the default, suggesting that by that time private investors were already
quite concerned about the sustainability of the Convertibility regime. However,
back in the mid 1990s, Argentina was one of the most important recipient of eq-
uity and international loans both among the countries of our sample and among
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emerging markets as a whole. Indeed, in between 1993 and 1998 the combined
net amount of these three categories of capital inflows averaged as much as 12%
of domestic credit .12
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Figure 7: Corporate activity in international financial markets
Finally, in order to compare corporate activity in international financial mar-
kets we use data from DCM Analytic to track cross-border financial operations
involving our sample countries’ private sectors during the three years that pre-
ceded the launching of the restructuring. More precisely, we look for bonds and
equity issuances in foreign jurisdictions, and for syndicated loans operations
with international banks. As shown in Figure 7, according to this database Ar-
gentina and Russia were by far the most active players in international financial
markets among the countries of our sample. Syndicated credit appears to have
been the most important source of external credit both for the Argentine and
for the Russian corporate sectors. However, Argentine firms were also able to
issue bonds externally on a substantial scale (for an average amount of close
to 3% of domestic credit) while Russian firms did participate in foreign equity
markets (for an average amount of about 2% of domestic credit). Again, this
experience is consistent with the idea that the largest the reliance of domestic
firms on external finance, the likelier will the government be to discriminate
against resident creditors. On the other hand, the fact that Pakistan did dis-
criminate against external creditors in spite of displaying a relatively substantial
corporate activity in international financial markets (syndicated loans averaged
about 10% of domestic credit prior to the crisis) does not square well with this
hypothesis. To some extent, this may be due to the fact that, as emphasized
above, Pakistan resorted to inflation in order to cope with domestic liquidity
12 IFS, WDI and authors’ calculations.
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pressures. Furthermore, given its relatively low level of financial dollarization,
Pakistan had little room to extract domestically the volume of foreign currency
required to remain current on external debt.
After reviewing evidence in support of the above hypotheses on the deter-
minants of sovereigns’ incentives to discriminate against residents or external
creditors, this section presents a stylized model to show the mechanisms at play
A simple model of selective defaults
The environment
There are four types of agents: a government, domestic entrepreneurs, domestic
banks, and foreign investors. They interact during three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2.
At time t = 0, the Government must honour outstanding debt of size Bgh
with domestic banks and of size Bgf with foreign creditors. In so doing it can
use a predetermined amount T of resources.13 The decision to repay/default is
collected by the pair (dh, df ). The variable df ∈ (0, 1) reflects the proportion of
outstanding debt with foreigners being honoured, with the value 1 indicating full
repayment. The variable dh reflects domestic debt repayment and behaves in a
parallel way. Note that, depending on the resources available, the Government
may be forced to fully/partly default. At that same time, banks are holding s0
units of liquidity (or one-period safe bonds). For simplicity, the gross safe rate
is set equal to one.
After public debt repayment, at t = 1, entrepreneurs receive an investment
opportunity which requires foreign and domestic capital.14 For simplicity, we
assume that both domestic and foreign borrowing must be fully collateralized
and that entrepreneurs have a limited amount of collateral that can be used
to back either type of borrowing.15 More specifically, entrepreneurs have an
amount Cd of domestic collateral and Cf units of foreign collateral. Converse
to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), we assume that each type of collateral
is specific for the corresponding type of capital.
At this time, domestic banks‘ will have available resources of size D. This
will include domestic debt obligations honoured by the Government. Banks then
use these resources to form a portfolio of loans to domestic entrepreneurs, be,
and holdings of the safe asset, s1. Note that, through its impact on the banks’
balance sheet, the Government’s repayment choice can affect private domestic
borrowing.
In turn, foreign capital must be obtained on international capital markets.
We assume that foreign lenders are risk neutral and have deep pockets. Further,
13We take Bgh, B
g
f and T as given.
14The need for both types of resources represent the fact that most production opportunities
require foreign machinery, intermediate goods or know-how.
15This similar to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001). Our modeling of domestic credit
provisioning is, however, different. The absence of a credit chain, together with the non-
pledgability if future output, has implications for the domestic interest rate that remains
equal to that on foreign borrowing.
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we assume that Cf depends on the Government‘s repayment decision, Cf (df ),
with ∂Cf (df )∂df > 0.Private collateral is less valued the higher the proportion of
sovereign foreign debt suffering from default. This is the way in which Gov-
ernment actions towards foreign creditors can affect the borrowing decisions by
entrepreneurs. By affecting the collateral valuation, a sovereign default on exter-
nal debt has the potential to affect the amount of borrowing that entrepreneurs
can obtain from international sources.16
Finally, at time t = 2, the outcome from entrepreneurial activity and payoffs
are realized.
Optimization
The problem is solved backwards, starting with the entrepreneurs problem. We
begin by introducing both banks and foreign creditors’ behavior as their behav-
ior determines the financing constraints faced by the entrepreneurs.
Domestic banking sector
Recall that, in period t = 1, after the repayment decision by the government,




where s0 stands for the liquidity carried by the banks from time t = 0, and
dhB
h
g is the amount of public debt actually honoured and hence available for
private lending.17 The banks‘ assets, D, will be used to acquire either the safe
bond, s1, or to finance private investments, be. Domestic banks‘ balance sheet
must imply
s1 + be = D
with banks using all resources not lent to private entrepreneurs to acquire the
safe asset.
Additionally, when dealing with private borrowers, banks require adequate
collateral, and so
(1 + rh)be ≤ min(Ch, D),
with Ch representing the disposable amount of domestic collateral and rh stands
for the domestic interest rate. This equation determines maximum lending given
the realization of the collateral. It shows how lending to domestic entrepreneurs
can be limited by either a shortage of liquidity within the financial sector or by
a lack of adequate collateral.
16There is extensive empirical evidence showing that external defaults reduce private sector’s
abilityt to self-fund via international capital markets (Trebesch (2009) or Arteta and Hale
(2008). This modelling device is a shortcut to introduce such effect into the model.
17We are assuming that the domestic banking sector cannot access international markets to
finance domestic entrepeneurs. This simplifies the exposition while not affecting the existence
of the relevant trade-off.
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Foreign creditors
As banks, they sign collateralized agreements with entrepreneurs, so that
(1 + rf )b
f
e ≤ Cf ,
where bfe is the amount of lending extended by foreign creditors, Cf is the valua-
tion that foreign creditor make of the internationally pledgeable collateral from
domestic entrepreneurs and rf represents the interest rate on foreign capital.
Domestic entrepreneurs: Domestic liquidity and collateral utilization
At t = 1 entrepreneurs receive an investment opportunity represented by the
technology f(kh, kf ).18 As borrowing is collateralized, entrepreneurs solve the
following problem:
Max f(kh, kf )− (1 + rh)kh − (1 + rf )kf (1)
s.t.
(1 + rh)kh ≤ X (1a)
(1 + rf )kf ≤ Cf (1b)
where X = min(Ch, D).We define the Lagrange multipliers associated with (1a)
and (1b) as λ1 and λ2, respectively.
In what follows assume that Cd > Bhg + s0. This implies that X = D and,
therefore, any domestic liquidity shortage is due to a lack of liquidity within the
banking sector.19 This allows us to focus on situations in which Government
impact on banks’ balance sheets has the potential to affect the real economy.
As a first step, it is useful to characterize the benchmark equilibrium allo-
cation in the absence of credit frictions.
Proposition 1 In a non-binding equilibrium, entrepreneurs would set their de-
mand of foreign and domestic capital to fulfill the following condition
fkf (kh, kf )− rh = fkh(kh, kf )− rf .
For future reference I define the unconstrained optimum as (kopth , k
opt
f ).
Proof. From (1) is immediate.
Corollary 2 There exist upper limits for both D and Cf , defined as D = k∗h
and Cf = k∗f respectively, such that: if D > D and Cf > Cf , then λ1 = 0 and
λ2 = 0.
18We consider a standard decreasing returns to scale technology, so that fkh > 0, fkf > 0,
fkhkh < 0 and fkfkf < 0.
19Note that a lack of liquidity could arise both if collateral is too low, Cd < D, or if the
banking sector does not have enough liquidity, Cd > D. The distinction is of importance
because, it is in the second case when domestic debt repayment is likely to have have an
impact, as it allows banks to lend further.
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In general, however, equilibrium allocations can be constrained and depend
not only of the technology available but on D, Cf and Cd :
kh = kh(D,Cf , Cd),
kf = kh(D,Cf , Cd),
λ1 = λ1(D,Cf , Cd),
and
λ2 = λ2(D,Cf , Cd).
Credit availability within the banking sector and international collateral within
the entrepreneurial sector are main determinants of equilibrium output. The
importance of banks’ liquidity is collected by λ1, the shadow value of the do-
mestic capital constraint. Analogously, the benefit from increasing foreign credit
by one unit is collected in λ2.
In turn, the dependence of Cf and D on dh and df , implies that the repay-
ment decisions of the Government may affect entrepreneurs optimal decisions
and welfare. It is this that creates the incentives of the government to discrimi-
nate in one or another direction will vary. This implies that sovereign repayment
impact on welfare can be measured as a transformation of the Lagrange multi-
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where α = ∂Cf∂df .
Government behavior
The Government receives revenues T and decides if it repays acquired debts.
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withW = f(kf , kh)−(1+rh)kh−(1+rf )kf−dhBgh−dfB
g
f+D+T. W represents
the aggregate domestic welfare. It adds up net wealth from entrepreneurs,
domestic banks and the public sector.
Depending on the realization of the tax revenues, the government faces two
scenarios. On the one hand, if T > Bgh + B
g
f , the government has enough
resources to honour all its obligations and we are in the classical situation in
which if a external default arise is due to unwillingness to repay. On the other
hand, when T is low, the government can not fulfill all of its obligations and
it is forced to default or at least choose what type of agents will face a default
(selective default). This situation represents the ability to repay problem.




f as given, an equilibrium is com-
posed by a set (dh, df ) of time 0 decisions and a set of time 1 choices (bfe , be, kh, kf )
and prices (rh, rf ), such that:
(i) All agents maximize their expected utility, and
(ii) credit markets are in equilibrium: be = kh and bfe = kf
When and on whom do Governments default?
In what follows, we solve the model under a set of assumptions which will help
us to clarify the mechanisms at work:
(i) f(kh, kf ) = akαh + bk
β
f , with α < 1 and β < 1.
(ii) Private borrowing must be fully collateralized. As a result, rh = rf = 1.
(iii) Cf (df ) = (C + dfcf ).
Assumption (i) implies decreasing returns to scale and guarantees the exis-
tence of an unconstrained interior solution. In turn, by using assumption (ii) we
focus the analysis on quantities.20 Finally, the functional form in assumption
(iii) could be interpreted as indicating that there is a borrowing ceiling equal to
(C + cf ). This ceiling is available as long as the Government fully honours its
obligations. As the amount of losses from sovereign borrowing increase, foreign
creditors reduce the level of the ceiling. In the extreme case of a full external
default, entrepreneurs wont be able to borrow above C.
There are four potential outcomes of the entrepreneurs problem. We present
them and discuss Government incentives for debt repayment in each of them.
Unconstrained optimum In this case entrepreneurs attain their first best.
The FOCs are
fkh(kh, kf )− 1 = aαkα−1h − 1 = 0 ([kh])
and
fkf (kh, kh)− 1 = bβk
β−1
f − 1 = 0. ([kf ])
20This is assumption is used only to clarify the mechanisms at play. While allowing for risky
private borrowing could potentially limit the impact on quantities by introducing a price effect,
we believe that the mechanism presented here would remain active.
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λ1 = λ2 = 0.
It is immediate that, when faced with this situation, entrepeneurs will not profit
from increased access to foreign capital and government will make no foreign
debt repayments as it would be detrimental for aggregate welfare.
Underprovision of domestic liquidity and insufficiency of interna-
tional collateral. The banking sector is unable to provide as much credit as
entrepreneurs want. At the same time, entrepreneurs would be willing to acquire
more foreign capital but they fall short of international collateral. Therefore
equilibrium allocations are




kf = Cf < k
opt
f .
In this case λ2 > 0 and λ1 > 0:
aαDα−1 − 1 = λ1 > 0 (2)
and
bβCβ−1f − 1 = λ2 > 0 (3)
In this situation, both domestic and foreign debt repayment increase entre-
preneurs welfare. Considering the impact on its own wealth and on that of the
banking sector, the Government has to decide whether the aggregate welfare
from paying either domestic or foreign repayment is large enough.
Underprovision of domestic liquidity and unconstrained external bor-
rowing. Firms would like to borrow more domestically but a lack of liquidity
in the financial system prevents them from doing so. Conversely, foreign collat-
eral is enough to guarantee as much foreign capital as needed. Now we have
that λ2 = 0 and λ1 > 0. The FOCs look as follows:
aαDα−1 − 1 = λ1 > 0 ([kd])
and
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Starting from this situation, the government will begin by repaying its do-
mestic debt obligations, as increases in domestic capital arising from higher
banks’ wealth can be matched by increased foreign borrowing.
Sufficient domestic liquidity and constrained external borrowing. In
this situation firms are able to borrow domestically as much as needed, so that
λ1 = 0. They would like, however, to have more collateral to increase the scale
of production by acquiring more foreign capital, λ2 > 0. FOCs and equilibrium
allocations are:
aαkα−1d = 1 ([kd])
and






In this case domestic debt repayment will have no impact on welfare. Gov-
ernments will honour foreign obligations only as long as the gain obtained by
the private sector more than compensates the reduction in cash balances of the
government.
As in the general case, the dependence of Cf and D on df and dh creates
incentives for public debt repayment. This implies that part of the impact of
sovereign debt repayment on welfare can be measured as a transformation of
the Lagrange multipliers from the entrepeneurs problem.























= λ2cf . (5)
On the incidence of default
Recall the Government’s problem:
Max
dh,df
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where Π[.] represents the profits from entrepreneurial activities.
In what follows we focus on some of the different equilibria that may arise
in this setting and put them in context with our empirical findings.21
Willingness to repay
Suppose first that T > Bgh +B
g
f .
22 In this case, the government problem is one
of willingness to repay reduces to
Max
dh,df
Π[kh(s0, Cf , dh, df ), kf (s0, Cf , dh, df )]− dfBgf + s0 + T.









Using (4) and (5), these results the conditions can be rewritten as:




where we have defined τ = cf
Bgf
. This parameter could be interpreted as the
catalytic effect of sovereign debt repayment. Whenever τ > 1, the country’s
private external borrowing ceiling increases by τ for every dollar repaid by the
sovereign.
Domestic debt repayment







Note that d∗h is such that it guarantees that the entrepeneurial sector has
access to as much domestic capital as it requires. While it is true that further
domestic debt repayment does not lead to further increases in output, repayment
amounts to a redistribution of wealth from the government to the financial
sector. Therefore, in this situation full domestic repayment, d∗h = 1, is not
detrimental for aggregate welfare.
21A full characterization of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem is available under
request.
22As shown in the Appendix, all that is needed for government to repay as much as it wills
is to have available resources T > T ∗ = ?D + τ( bβτ )
1
1−β − (s0 + τC).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1027
Foreign debt repayment
Foreign debt, in turn, will be serviced as long as the increase in entrepreneurial
profits, λ2cf , is at least as big as the amount of resources leaving the public
coffers, Bgf . That is, foreigners will face a partial default if
λ2(d
∗
f ) = τ
−1 for d∗f < 1.






A first thing to note is that, as long as C < koptf = (bβ)
1
1−β , the entrepeneurs
will not be able to borrow their optimum. This is so because, while entrepeneurs
are only concerned with their private benefits, the Government also considers
the impact of repayment on its own wealth. This creates a wedge between the
desired level foreign capital for entrepeneurs and the optimal level of foreign
capital from an aggregate perspective. Another direct implication of this set up
is that, as long as cf + c < (τβb)
1
1−β , the Government has incentives to fully
repay its external obligations, d∗f = 1.
Note that, in line with our empirical evidence (Figure 2), the higher Bgf
(external exposure) the easier will be that d∗f < 1, with foreigners suffering a
debt haircut. To see this, one just needs to realize that ∂τ∂Bgf
< 0.
Similarly, the lower the productivity (defined by either b or β) of foreign
capital the less it will be demanded. As a result, the likelier will be that the
government partly defaults on its external obligations. Our empirical evidence
(see Figures 5 to 7) focus on capital flows. We have shown that countries with
more foreign capital flowing in are potentially less likely to discriminate against
foreigners. The model presents the analogous argument but focusing on capital
stocks instead.
Finally, it is immediate that, the lower is cf , the punishment suffered by
private agents when the government defaults, the more likely it is that the
Government will choose to at least partly default in it’s foreign debt.23
Creditor discrimination and ability to repay
In case there is a revenue shortage, T < T ∗, the government will be forced to
default on part of its obligations. It must then decide how to divide this credit
loss between residents and foreigners.











23Note that this result has no empirical counterpart on our case study analysis.
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Which can be written in a more compact way as follows
λ1(dh) = τλ2(df )− 1 (8)
Equation (8) simply states that, at the margin, the welfare increase per unit
of repayment from an increase in debt repayment to foreigners (RHS) must
be equal to the effect on welfare of a marginal increase per unit of repayment
to domestic banks (LHS). That is, an additional unit of repayment provides
identical aggregate welfare regardless the creditor involved.




f = T , completely determine the
sovereign repayment behavior.
Using equations (2), (3) and the budget constraint, (8) can be expressed as
αa
[s0 + T − dfBgf ]1−α
=
τβb
[C + dfcf ]1−β
− τ . (9)
From equation (9) it is inmediate to perform comparative statics.
First, note that as αaβb increases the relative productivity of domestic capital
increases. As a result, the optimal strategy for the Government would be to
reduce df while increasing dh. This is again, the theoretical counterpart of our
finding that contries which have foreign flows relatively smaller wehn c ompared
with domestic credit are more likely to place a larger weight of the adjustment
on external creditors.
It is also clear that, as s0 increases, so that the banking sector ability to
provide domestic credit even in the absence of public repayment is larger, the
Government has stronger incentives to increase repayment to foreigners at the
expense of the domestic banks.
Finally, as the amount of public debt on domestic hands increases, the pro-
portion that needs to be repaid to attain the desired level of domestic capital is
smaller, leading to an increase in repayment of foreign debts at the expense of
domestic creditors.
Domestic defaults
When will a sovereign place all the adjustment effort on its domestic creditors?
We show below that, in line with the empirical evidence, if the domestic banking
sector is healthy enough and/or foreign financing is either very necessary or
very sensitive to external repayment problems, the Government will decide to
cancel debt payments to residents in order to fulfill its obligations with external
creditors.
According to our model, the Government will devote all its resources to






The inequality above states that available resources will be fully used to repay
foreign creditors whenever the gain of marginally deviating funds to the domestic
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banking sector (LHS) is smaller than the gain obtained by using such funds for
external repayment (RHS).
Proposition 4 The stronger the banking sector balance sheet and the less im-
portant domestic capital is for entrepeneurs, the easier that the government will
choose domestic banks as the objective of the debt default.













It is inmediate that increases in s0 and decreases in αb make it likelier that the
above inequality will hold.
External defaults
Analogously, when the following condition holds the Government devotes all





) > τλ2(0)− 1.
Note that, beginning from a situation where all available resources are used
to repay domestic obligations, reducing domestic repayment to increases foreign
repayment would lead to a reduction in welfare of size λ1( TBgh
), due to reduced
lending by domestic banks, while producing an increase in welfare, τλ2(0)− 1,
resulting from substracting from the welfare increase obtained from of expanded
borrowing capacity the direct cost for the public coffers from servicing the debt.
Proposition 5 Governments of countries for which foreign capital is a rela-
tively less important input or whose supply of foreign capital is relatively in-
elastic to sovereign defaults are more likely to discriminate against domestic
creditors if the need arises.
Proof. Use equations (2) and (3) along with the budget constraint and the
specified behavior of the Government to get
aα





Again, it is clear that as b falls relative to a the RHS raises relative to the
LHS, making a full external default more likely. Similarly, as C increases the
RHS decreases, raising the potential for using all resources to cover domestic
debt obligations.
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Conclusions
Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and other recent contributions, there is
a growing awareness about the fact that a traditional disregard to the role
played by domestic creditors may constitute a substantial gap in the literature
on sovereign risk and debt restructurings. This paper contributes to fill that gap
by analyzing the relative seniority of domestic and external debt both from an
empirical and a theoretical perspective. The central idea that is to be extracted
from this paper is that contrary to what is commonly assumed in the literature
neither domestic nor external obligations can be considered intrinsically senior.
Rather, we argue that the relative seniority between both types of obligations
is state dependent and determined by factors such as the structure of sovereign
debt, the state of the financial system and the reliance of domestic firms on
international capital markets.
On the empirical side, we study 10 recent sovereign debt restructurings and
analyze the role that both domestic and external creditors played during these
episodes. Interestingly, and converse to standard assumptions in recent models
on sovereign risk, we provide evidence that governments may treat external and
domestic creditors differently, with discrimination affecting the two groups in
non homogenous ways. Indeed, while the Belizean, Dominican, the Pakistani
and (to a lesser extent) the Ecuadorian governments spared resident creditors
from the restructurings, in the Argentine, the Russian and (to a lesser extent)
the Ukrainian cases, the authorities did initially try to put the weight of the
restructuring on domestic financial institutions. To some extent, this was simply
due to the origin of liquidity pressures: the countries that discriminated against
residents tended to be struggling primarily with domestic obligations. However
we find significant exceptions to this pattern. First, if the Central Bank lacks
independence and domestic debt is denominated in local currency, this debt may
be monetized (as in Pakistan) in order to relieve the sovereign from domestic
sources of liquidity pressure. Second, if the domestic financial sector is highly
dollarized (as in Argentina) the government may opt to discriminate against
resident creditors in order to extract liquidity domestically and alleviate external
sources of liquidity pressure.
On top of this rather mechanic liquidity pressure hypothesis, we find that
sovereigns’ discriminatory stance is likely to be influenced by certain features
of their domestic financial systems. Through its impact on domestic banks’
balance sheets, a default on domestic debt is likely to depress domestic credit
provisioning and, therefore, economic activity. However, the extent to which a
domestic debt restructuring will spill over to the real sector will depend on the
importance of bank intermediation. In other words, in countries with low levels
of intermediation such as Russia and Ukraine discriminating against residents
was seen as a less costly option than in countries with high levels of intermedi-
ation such as the Caribbean nations of our sample. In addition, sovereigns do
base their decision to discriminate on the ex ante health of their banking sys-
tems. When the debt crisis is preceded by a banking crisis, as in the Dominican
Republic or Ecuador, defaulting on domestic obligations is likely to be perceived
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as a “last nail in the coffin” of domestic banks, which is why sovereigns tend
to discriminate against non-residents. In turn, when the domestic financial sys-
tem is perceived to be sound ex ante (as in Argentina), the government may be
tempted to “gamble for redemption” by discriminating against residents as the
debt crisis unfolds.
The third mechanism that is identified in this paper is that played by inter-
national capital markets: external defaults have been shown to curtail foreign
inflows to private agents. As a result, the potential impact of defaults on private
capital flows and the relative importance of these flows for the domestic produc-
tive sector are likely to be taken into account by governments undergoing a debt
crisis. Russia and Ukraine with tight domestic financial constraints and with
local firms’ substantial reliance on international sources of finance may best fit
this profile: keeping access to external financiers may have been seen as a less
costly option than impairing domestic banks’ balance sheets.
In order to complement this empirical evidence, the paper presents a highly
stylized model of sovereign debt repayment able to replicate the empirical evi-
dence. We believe that a similar mechanism should be a center piece of models
studying sovereign debt crises.
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Appendix
Model’s Time Line
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Government
Observes (T,C, s0).




Use C as collateral to













































TABLE 1 - RESTRUCTURINGS: KEY FEATURES
*  We consider 2004 as the year of the restructuring t even if the debt exchange offer was launched in December of the previous year.
1 Closest available data to the launch of the exchange.
2 Index of Government Coerciveness ( Enderlein, Müller and Trebesch, 2007), ranging from 0 (cooperative restructuring without missed payments) to 9 (highest level of coerciveness).
3 No domestically issued debt instrument was restructured but one third of the bonds exchanged in late 1999 were held by residents.
4 The formal debt exchange offer was made in April 2004.
5 The exchange offer formally closed in June 2004, but the deal was not completed until 2007 due to discussions with hold out creditors.
6 Although this was a pre-emptive restructuring, 2 bonds were in legal dispute.
7 The offer was launched in September 2005.
8 Ukraine was in default for a short period.
9 Some minor bonds carried a higher haircut (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2005).
10 Additionally, 58 bn USD of 2002 pesification were redollarised in 2003.
11 2003 Paris Club agreement not included.
12 Quarters after the announcement of the reestructuring (except Argentina's int. bond issuance: quarters after December 2001 default).
SOURCES: Erce and Diaz-Cassou (2010), “Sovereign Defaults and Creditor Discrimination”. Documento de Trabajo de Banco de España (forthcoming), Diaz-Cassou and Erce (2008), “The role of the IMF 
  1998 1999 1998 1999 2001 2003 2004* 2004 2004 2006
Russia Pakistan Ukraine Ecuador Argentina Uruguay Dominica Dom. Rep. Grenada Belize
Debt to GDP (%)1 51 84 42 100
62.2 (2001); 
132 (2004)
104 130 56 129 98
Restructured debt  (%GDP) 32 27 14.80 46
30 (2001); 
53.4 (2005)
44 83 6 61 46
Restructured debt  (USD bn)
71.6 (at pre-crisis 
exchange rates for 1998-
98 debt exchange)
19 4.7 7.81 162.310 5.35 0.21 1.91 0.29 0.56
Rest. debt owed to the private sector (% GDP) 28.3 2.5 12.9 40.8
30 (2001); 
53.4 (2005)
44.0 83 4.6 58.6 46.1
Paris Club reschedulings (% GDP) 4.14 24.9 1.85 5.52 11 no resch. no resch. no resch. 1.28 2.83 no resch.
Announcement of the restructuring aug - 98 jan - 99 aug - 98 oct - 99 june -01 march - 03 dec - 034 apr - 04 oct - 047 aug - 06
Completion of the restructuring aug - 00 dec - 01 july - 01 end -00 june - 05 may - 03 june - 045 oct - 05 nov - 05 feb - 07
Duration (months) 24 35 35 14 46 2 6 12 6
Default on external private debt n n n8 y y n n6 n y n
Default on domestic private debt y n n y y n n6 n y n
Default on official debt Y Y n8 Y Y n n n y n
External debt restructuring y y y y y y y y y y
Domestic debt restructuring y n3 y y y y y n y n
Official debt restructuring Y y y y y n n y y n
NPV loss (%) (40,75) (29-33) (5-59.2) (9-47) (25-82) (5-20)9 50 (1-2) (40-45) (1-28)
Participation in the exchange (%) 92 99 99 98 76 93 79 97 91 98
Coerciveness index2 (3,6) (2,4) (0,1) 5 (0,7) 0 1 (1,3) 1 1
Capital controls y y y n y n n n n n
Deposit freezes y y n Y Y Y n n n n
Access to int'l capital markets 12
1st int'l bond issuance (3 months periods) 5 19 3 23 14 0 - 4 not yet not yet
EMBI Global level below 1000 p.b. 11 9 7 16 16 1 - 2 - 0
Liquidity:
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, 
services and income - t-1)
7 22 7 30 69 40 11 8 15 35
TDS (% total reserves including gold, t-1) 40 126 57 87 107 162 28 290 33 306
in recent sovereign debt restructurings: Implications for the LIA Policy”. Banco de España, DO 0805. WDI , IMF, Moody's, ECB, Paris Club, Datastream, Dealogic, UNCTAD and authors' calculations.
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Figure 4: Deposits, credit to the private sector and Central Bank
liquidity support
Total deposits Credit to the private sector
Total deposits USD Liquidity support - rhs
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Figure 6: Portfolio equity and other investment to the private sector
Russia and Ukraine: (t-4, t-1)
DC: Domestic credit
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